Sunspots and Lotteries

• Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries, Edward C. Prescott and Karl Shell pp. 1-10
• Symposium Equilibrium Prices When the Sunspot Variable Is Continuous, Rod Garratt, Todd Keister, Cheng-Zhong Qin and Karl Shell pp. 11-38
• Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints, Timothy J. Kehoe, David K. Levine and Edward C. Prescott pp. 39-69

General Equilibrium Approach to Economic Growth

• Introduction to a General Equilibrium Approach to Economic Growth, Christian Ghiglino pp. 1-17
• Factor Saving Innovation, Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine pp. 18-41
• Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-geometric Discounting, Per Krusell, Burhanettin Kuruscu and Anthony A.Smith, Jr. pp. 42-72
• On Non-existence of Markov Equilibria in Competitive-Market Economies, Manuel S. Santos pp. 73-98
• Equilibrium Dynamics in a Two-Sector Model with Taxes, Salvador Ortigueira and Manuel S. Santos pp. 99-119
• Poverty Traps, Indeterminacy, and the Wealth Distribution, Christian Ghiglino and Gerhard Sorger pp. 120-139
• Intersectoral Externalities and Indeterminacy, Kazuo Nishimura and Alain Venditti pp. 140-157
• Optimal Growth Models with Bounded or Unbounded Returns: A Unifying Approach, Cuong Le Van and Lisa Morhaim pp. 158-187
• Ramsey Equilibrium in a Two-Sector Model with Heterogeneous Households, Robert A. Becker and Eugene N. Tsyganov pp. 188-225
• On the Long-Run Distribution of Capital in the Ramsey Model, Gerhard Sorger pp. 226-243
• Trade and Indeterminacy in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model, Kazuo Nishimura and Koji Shimomura pp. 244-260

Experimental Game Theory

• Introduction to Experimental Game Theory, Vincent P. Crawford pp. 1-15
• Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining, Eric J. Johnson, Colin Camerer, Sankar Sen and Talia Rymon pp. 16-47
• A Backward Induction Experiment, Ken Binmore, John McCarthy, Giovanni Ponti, Larry Samuelson and Avner Shaked pp. 48-88
• Implementation by Iterative Dominance and Backward Induction: An Experimental Comparison, Elena Katok, Martin Sefton and Abdullah Yavas pp. 89-103
• A Suggested Interpretation of Some Experimental Results on Preplay Communication, Miguel A. Costa-Gomes pp. 104-136
• Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games, Colin F. Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho and Juin-Kuan Chong pp. 137-188
• Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis, Jason M. Shachat pp. 189-226
• Prudence, Justice, Benevolence, and Sex: Evidence from Similar Bargaining Games, John Van Huyck and Raymond Battalio pp. 227-246
• Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions, Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt and Thomas R. Palfrey pp. 247-272

Political Science

• Introduction to Political Science, David Austen-Smith, Jeffrey S. Banks and Aldo Rustichini pp. 1-10
• Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model, Hülya Eraslan pp. 11-30
• Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining, Hülya Eraslan and Antonio Merlo pp. 31-48
• Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game, Matthew O. Jackson and Boaz Moselle pp. 49-87
• Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections, Jeffrey S. Banks, John Duggan and Michel Le Breton pp. 88-105
• Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition, Jean-François Laslier and Nathalie Picard pp. 106-130
• Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate, Enriqueta Aragones and Thomas R. Palfrey pp. 131-161
• Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies, Andrea Prat pp. 162-189
• Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy, Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew O. Jackson and Michel Le Breton pp. 190-218
• Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games, Roger B. Myerson pp. 219-251

Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

• Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring, Michihiro Kandori pp. 1-15
• Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring, V. Bhaskar and Eric van Damme pp. 16-39
• Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring, V. Bhaskar and Ichiro Obara pp. 40-69
• The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring, Michele Piccione pp. 70-83
• A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma, Jeffrey C. Ely and Juuso Välimäki pp. 84-105
• On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations, Olivier Compte pp. 106-150
• On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private, Olivier Compte pp. 151-188
• Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris pp. 189-228
• Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication, Masaki Aoyagi pp. 229-248

Monetary and Financial Arrangements

• Introduction to Monetary and Financial Arrangements, Bruce D. Smith pp. 1-21
• Limited Commitment, Money, and Credit, Saqib Jafarey and Peter Rupert pp. 22-58
• Private and Public Circulating Liabilities, Costas Azariadis, James Bullard and Bruce D. Smith pp. 59-116
• Cigarette Money, Kenneth Burdett, Alberto Trejos and Randall Wright pp. 117-142
• Dynamic Consequences of Stabilization Policies Based on a Return to a Gold Standard, Beatrix Paal pp. 143-186
• Monetary Stability and Liquidity Crises: The Role of the Lender of Last Resort, Gaetano Antinolfi, Elisabeth Huybens and Todd Keister pp. 187-219
• A Model of Financial Fragility, Roger Lagunoff and Stacey L. Schreft pp. 220-264
• Volatile Policy and Private Information: The Case of Monetary Shocks, Larry E. Jones and Rodolfo E. Manuelli pp. 265-296
• Payments Systems Design in Deterministic and Private Information Environments, Ted Temzelides and Stephen D. Williamson pp. 297-326
• When Should Bank Regulation Favor the Wealthy?, Pere Gomis-Porqueras pp. 327-337
• On Credible Monetary Policy and Private Government Information, Christopher Sleet pp. 338-376

Evolution of Preferences

• Introduction to the Evolution of Preferences, Larry Samuelson pp. 225-230
• On the Evolution of Individualistic Preferences: An Incomplete Information Scenario, Efe A. Ok and Fernando Vega-Redondo pp. 231-254
• Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences, Jeffrey C. Ely and Okan Yilankaya pp. 255-272
• Preference Evolution and Reciprocity, Rajiv Sethi and E. Somanathan pp. 273-297
• The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences, Alberto Bisin and Thierry Verdier pp. 298-319
• Analogies, Adaptation, and Anomalies, Larry Samuelson pp. 320-366

Intertemporal Equilibrium Theory: Indeterminacy, Bifurcations, and Stability

• Introduction to Intertemporal Equilibrium Theory: Indeterminacy, Bifurcations, and Stability, Tapan Mitra and Kazuo Nishimura pp. 1-12
• Growth Cycles and Market Crashes, Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine pp. 13-39
• The Perils of Taylor Rules, Jess Benhabib, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé and Martín Uribe pp. 40-69
• Growth Dynamics and Returns to Scale: Bifurcation Analysis, Gaetano Antinolfi, Todd Keister and Karl Shell pp. 70-96
• Chaotic Equilibrium Dynamics in Endogenous Growth Models, Michele Boldrin, Kazuo Nishimura, Tadashi Shigoka and Makoto Yano pp. 97-132
• A Sufficient Condition for Topological Chaos with an Application to a Model of Endogenous Growth, Tapan Mitra pp. 133-152
• A Spatial-Temporal Model of Human Capital Accumulation, Venkatesh Bala and Gerhard Sorger pp. 153-179
• Optimal Environmental Management in the Presence of Irreversibilities, José Scheinkman and Thaleia Zariphopoulou pp. 180-207
• On a Class of Stable Random Dynamical Systems: Theory and Applications, Rabi Bhattacharya and Mukul Majumdar pp. 208-229
• Determinacy of Equilibrium in an Overlapping Generations Model with Heterogeneous Agents, Carine Nourry and Alain Venditti pp. 230-255
• Discounting and Long-Run Behavior: Global Bifurcation Analysis of a Family of Dynamical Systems, Tapan Mitra and Kazuo Nishimura pp. 256-293

Political Economy

• Limits of Markets and Limits of Governments: An Introduction to a Symposium on Political Economy, V. V. Chari pp. 1-6
• Large Poisson Games, Roger B. Myerson pp. 7-45
• Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies, Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo pp. 46-79
• Political Power and the Credibility of Government Debt, Avinash Dixit and John Londregan pp. 80-105
• The Economic Effects of Restrictions on Government Budget Deficits, Christian Ghiglino and Karl Shell pp. 106-137

Modeling Money and Studying Monetary Policy

• Introduction to Modeling Money and Studying Monetary Policy, Neil Wallace pp. 223-231
• Money Is Memory, Narayana R. Kocherlakota pp. 232-251
• A Rudimentary Random-Matching Model with Divisible Money and Prices, Edward J. Green and Ruilin Zhou pp. 252-271
• Incomplete Record-Keeping and Optimal Payment Arrangements, Narayana Kocherlakota and Neil Wallace pp. 272-289
• Government Transaction Policy, Media of Exchange, and Prices, Yiting Li and Randall Wright pp. 290-313
• Search for a Monetary Propagation Mechanism, Shouyong Shi pp. 314-352
• Financial Market Frictions, Monetary Policy and Capital Accumulation in a Small Open Economy, Elisabeth Huybens and Bruce D. Smith pp. 353-400
• Price Level Volatility: A Simple Model of Money Taxes and Sunspots, Joydeep Bhattacharya, Mark G. Guzman and Karl Shell pp. 401-430
• Credible Monetary Policy in an Infinite Horizon Model: Recursive Approaches, Roberto Chang pp. 431-461
• Expectation Traps and Discretion, V. V. Chari, Lawrence J. Christiano and Martin Eichenbaum pp. 462-492

Sunspots in Macroeconomics

• Introduction to Sunspots in Macroeconomics, Jess Benhabib pp. 1-6
• Capacity Utilization under Increasing Returns to Scale, Yi Wen pp. 7-36
• Fickle Consumers, Durable Goods, and Business Cycles, Mark Weder pp. 37-57
• Indeterminacy and Sunspots with Constant Returns, Jess Benhabib and Kazuo Nishimura pp. 58-96

Market Psychology and Nonlinear Endogenous Business Cycles

• Introduction to Market Psychology and Nonlinear Endogenous Business Cycles, Jean-Michel Grandmont pp. 1-13
• Capital-Labor Substitution and Competitive Nonlinear Endogenous Business Cycles, Jean-Michel Grandmont, Patrick Pintus and Robin de Vilder pp. 14-59
• Multiple Steady States and Endogenous Fluctuations with Increasing Returns to Scale in Production, Guido Cazzavillan, Teresa Lloyd-Braga and Patrick A. Pintus pp. 60-107
• Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures, Elchanan Ben-Porath pp. 108-122
• Aggregation, Determinacy, and Informational Efficiency for a Class of Economies with Asymmetric Information, Peter DeMarzo and Costis Skiadas pp. 123-152
• On the Optimal Order of Natural Resource Use When the Capacity of the Inexhaustible Substitute Is Limited, Jean-Pierre Amigues, Pascal Favard, Gérard Gaudet and Michel Moreaux pp. 153-170
• Partial Revelation with Rational Expectations, Aviad Heifetz and Heracles M. Polemarchakis pp. 171-181

Financial Market Innovation and Security Design

• Financial Market Innovation and Security Design: An Introduction, Darrell Duffie and Rohit Rahi pp. 1-42
• Welfare Effects of Financial Innovation in Incomplete Markets Economies with Several Consumption Goods, Ronel Elul pp. 43-78
• Financial Innovation in a General Equilibrium Model and Wolfgang Pesendorfer pp. 79-116
• Financial Innovation and Arbitrage Pricing in Frictional Economies, Zhiwu Chen pp. 117-135
• Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market, Utpal Bhattacharya , Philip J. Reny and Matthew Spiegel pp. 136-170
• Optimal Incomplete Markets with Asymmetric Information, Rohit Rahi pp. 171 -197
• Endogenous Determination of the Degree of Market-Incompleteness in Futures Innovation, Kazuhiko Hashi pp. 198-217
• Optimality of Incomplete Markets, Gabrielle Demange and Guy Laroque pp. 218-232
• Private Information and the Design of Securities, Gabrielle Demange and Guy Laroque pp. 233-257
• Commission-Revenue Maximization in a General Equilibrium Model of Asset Creation, Chiaki Hara pp. 258-298

Growth, Fluctuations, and Sunspots: Confronting the Data

• Introduction to the Symposium on Growth, Fluctuations, and Sunspots: Confronting the Data, Jess Benhabib and Aldo Rustichini pp. 1-18
• Indeterminacy and Increasing Returns, Jess Benhabib and Roger E. A. Farmer pp. 19-41
• Real Business Cycles and the Animal Spirits Hypothesis, Roger E. A. Farmer and Jang-Ting Guo pp. 42-72
• Monopolistic Competition, Business Cycles, and the Composition of Aggregate Demand, Jordi Galí­ pp. 73-96
• Divergence in Economic Performance: Transitional Dynamics with Multiple Equilibria, Danyang Xie pp. 97-112
• Uniqueness and Indeterminacy: On the Dynamics of Endogenous Growth, Jess Benhabib and Roberto Perli pp. 113-142

Economic Growth: Theory and Computation

organized by Larry E. Jones and Nancy L. Stokey
Vol. 58, No. 2, December 1992
Introduction: Symposium on Economic Growth, Theory and Computations, Larry E. Jones and Nancy L. Stokey, pp.117-134

• SAVINGS BEHAVIOR
  • Random Earnings Differences, Lifetime Liquidity Constraints, and Altruistic Intergenerational Transfers, John Laitner, pp. 135-170

• • Finite Lifetimes and Growth, Larry E. Jones and Rodolfo E. Manuelli, pp. 171-197

• • Dynamic Externalities, Multiple Equilibria, and Growth, Michele Boldrin, pp. 198-218

• • Communication, Commitment, and Growth, Albert Marcet and Ramon Marimon, pp. 219-249

• POLICY ISSUES
  • Optimal Fiscal Policy in s Stochastic Growth Model, Xiaodong Zhu, pp. 250-289

• • Tax Distortions in a Neoclassical Monetary Economy, Thomas F. Cooley and Gary D. Hansen, pp. 290-316

• HUMAN CAPITAL
  • Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and economic Growth, Kiminori Matsuyama, pp. 317-334

• • The Last Shell Be First: Efficient Constraints on Foreign Borrowing in a Model of Endogenous Growth, Christophe Chamley, pp. 335-354

• • Efficient Equilibrium Convergence: Heterogeneity and Growth, Robert Tamura, pp. 355-376

• • In Search of Scale Effects in Trade and Growth, David K. Backus, Patrick J. Kehoe and Timothy J. Kehoe, pp. 377-409

Evolutionary Game Theory

organized by George J. Mailath
Vol. 57, No. 2, August 1992

• Introduction: Symposium on Evolutionary Game Theory, George J. Mailath, pp. 259-277
• Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata, Kenneth G. Binmore and Larry Samuelson, pp. 278-305
• Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants, Jeroen M. Swinkels, pp. 306-332
• Evolution and Strategic Stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens, Jeroen M. Swinkels, pp. 333-342
• Best Response Dynamics and Socially Stable Strategies, Akihiko Matsul, pp. 343-362
• Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games, Larry Samuelson and Jianbo Zhang, pp. 363-391
• On the evolution of Optimizing Behavior, Eddie Dekel and Suzanne Scotchmer, pp. 392-406
• On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics, Antonio Cabrales and Joel Sobel, pp.407-419
• Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks, D. Fudenberg and C. Harris, pp. 420-441
• Average Behavior in Learning Models, David Canning, pp. 442-472
• Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals, Richard T. Boylan, pp. 473-504

Noncooperative Bargaining

organized by Peter Linhart, Roy Radner and Mark Satterthwaite
Vol. 48, No. 1, June 1989

• Introduction: Noncooperative Bargaining, Peter Linhart, Roy Radner and Mark Satterthwaite, pp. 1-17
• A Direct Mechanism Characterization of Sequential Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information, Lawrence M. Ausubel and Raymond J. Deneckere, pp. 18-46
• Bargaining with Common Values, Daniel R. Vincent, pp. 47-62
• Equilibria of the Sealed-Bid Mechanism for Bargaining with Incomplete Information, W. Leininger, P. B. Linhart and R. Radner, pp. 63-107
• Bilateral Trade with the Sealed Bid k-Double Auction: Existence and Efficiency, Mark A. Satterthwaite, pp. 107-133
• The Bilateral Monopoly Model: Approaching Certainty under the Split-the-Difference Mechanism, Elizabeth M. Broman, pp. 134-151
• Minimax-Regret Strategies for Bargaining over Several Variables, P. B. Linhart and R. Radner, pp. 152-178
• The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study, Roy Radner and Andrew Schotter, pp. 179-220
• Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining, Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons, pp. 221-237
• Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions, Steven A. Matthews and Andrew Postlewaite, pp. 238-263
• Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans, Roger B. Myerson, pp. 264-303
• The Rate at Which a Simple Market Converges to Efficiency as the Number of Traders Increases: An Asymptotic Result for Optimal Trading Mechanisms, Thomas A. Gresik and Mark A. Satterthwaite, pp. 304-332

Intertemporal Decentralization in Infinite Horizon Models

organized by Mukul Majumdar
Vol. 45, No. 2, August 1988

• Decentralization in Infinite Horizon Economies: An Introduction, Mukul Majumdar, pp. 217-227
• Optimal Inter-temporal Allocation Mechanisms and Decentralization of Decisions, Leonid Hurwicz, pp. 228-261
• On Characterizing Optimal Competitive Programs in terms of Decentralizable Conditions, William A. Brock and Mukul Majumdar, pp. 262-273
• Characterization of Intertemporal Optimality in Terms of Decentralizable Conditions: The Discounted Case, Swapan Dasgupta and Tapan Mitra, pp. 274-287
• Intertemporal Optimality in a Closed Linear Model of Production, Swapan Dasgupta and Tapan Mitra, pp. 288-315
• On Characterizing Optimality of Stochastic Competitive Processes, Yaw Nyarko, pp. 316-329

Nonlinear Economic Dynamics

organized by Jean-Michel Grandmont
Vol. 40, No. 1, October 1986

• Introduction, Jean-Michel Grandmont and Pierre Malgrange, pp. 3-12
• Competitive Chaos, Raymond Deneckere and Steve Pelikan, pp. 13-25
• On the Indeterminacy of Capital Accumulation Paths, Michele Boldrin and Luigi Montrucchio, pp. 26-39
• Dynamic Complexity ion Duopoly Games, Rose-Anna Dana and Luigi Montrucchio, pp. 40-56
• Stabilizing Competitive Business Cycles, Jean-Michel Grandmont, pp. 57-76
• Deficits and Cycles, Roger E. A. Farmer, pg. 77-88
• Equilibrium Cycles in an Overlapping Generations Economy with Production, Pietro Reichlin, pp. 89-102
• Stationary Sunspot Equilibria in an N Commodity World, Roger Guesnerie, pp. 103-127
• Stationary Sunspot Equilibria in a Finance Constrained Economy, Michael Woodford, pp. 128-137
• Stability of Cycles and Expectations, Jean-Michel Grandmont and Guy Laroque, pp.138-151
• On the Local Convergence of Economic Mechanisms, Donald G. Saari and Steven R. Williams, pp. 152-167
• Distinguishing Random and Deterministic Systems: Abridged Version, W. A. Brock, pp. 168-195

Strategic Behavior and Competition

organized by Ehud Kalai
Vol. 39, No. 1, June 1986
Strategic Behavior and Competition: An Overview, Ehud Kalai, pp. 1-13
Equilibrium, Decentralization and Differential Information

• Implementation in Differential Information Economics, Andrew Postlewaite and David Schmeidler, pp. 14-33
• Private Information in Large Economics, Thomas R. Palfrey and Sanjay Srivastava, pp. 34- 58
• The Scope of the Hypothesis of Bayesian Equilibrium, John O. Ledyard, pp. 59-82

Rationality, Equilibrium Notions, Cooperation and Bargaining

• Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Ariel Rubinstein, pp. 83-96
• Perfect Sequential Equilibrium, Sanford J. Grossman and Motty Perry, pp. 97-119
• Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information, Sanford J. Grossman, pp. 120-154
• Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture, Faruk Gul, Hugo Sonnenschein and Robert Wilson, pp. 155-190

Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition

• Extremal Equibria of Oligopolistic Supergames, Dilip Abreu, pp. 191-225
• Subgame Perfect Reaction Function Equilibria in Discounted Duopoly Supergames Are Trivial, William G. Stanford, pp. 226-232
• On Continuous Reaction Function Equilibria in Duopoly Supergames with Mean Payoffs, William G. Stanford, pp. 233-250
• Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring, Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti, pp.251-269

Reputations in Finitely Repeated Games

organized by David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson
Vol. 27, No. 2, August 1982

• Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson, pp. 245-252
• Reputation and Imprefect Information, David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson, pp. 253-279
• Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence, Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, pp. 280-312

Rational Expectations in Microeconomic Models

organized by James S. Jordan and Roy Radner
Vol. 26, No. 2, April 1982

• Rational Expectations in Microeconomic Models: An Overview, James S. Jordan and Roy Radner, pp. 201-223
• The Generic Existence of Rational Expectations Equilibrium in the Higher Dimensional Case, J. S. Jordan, pp. 224-243
• Approximate Equilibria in Microeconomic Rational Expectations Models, Beth Allen, pp. 244-260
• On the Existence of rational Expectations Equilibrium, Robert M. Anderson and Hugo Sonnenschein, pp.261-278
• Expectations Equilibrium with Conditioning on Part Prices: A Mean-Variance Example, Martin F. Hellwig, pp. 279-312
• Introduction to the Stability of Rational Expectations Equilibrium, L.E. Blume, M.M. Bray and D. Easley, pp. 313-317
• Learning, Estimation and the Stability of Rational Expectations, Margaret Bray, pp. 318-339
• Learning to Be Rational, Lawrence E. Blume and David Easley, pp. 340-351

Non-Cooperative approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition

organized by Andreu Mas-Colell
Vol. 22, No. 2, April 1980

• Non-Cooperative approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition: Presentation, Andreu Mas-Colell, pp.121-135
• Collusive Behavior in Noncooperative Epsilon-Equilibria of Oligopolies with Long but Finite Lives, Roy Radner, pp.136-154
• Noncooperative Price Taking in Large Dynamic Markets, Edward J. Green, pp. 155-182
• The No-Surplus Condition as a Characterization of Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium, Joseph M. Ostroy, pp. 183-207
• A Characterization of Perfectly Competitive Economies with Production, Louis Makowski, pp. 208-221
• Perfect Competition, the Profit Criterion and the Organization of Economic Activity, Louis Makowski, pp. 222-242
• Small efficient Scale as a Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium, William Novshek and Hugo Sonnenschein, pp. 243-255
• The Limit Points of Monopolistic Competition, Kevin Roberts, pp. 256-278
• Perfect Competition and Optimal Product Differentiation, Oliver D. Hart, pp. 279-312
• Equilibrium in Simple Spatial (or Differentiated Product) Models, William Novshek, pp. 313-326
• Entry (and Exit) in a Differentiated Industry, J. Jaskold Gabszewicz and J.F. Thisse, pp. 327-338
• Efficiency Properties of Strategic Market Games: An Axiomatic Approach, Pradeep Dubey, Andreu Mas-Colell and Martin Shubik, pp. 339-362
• Nash Equilibria of Market Games: Finiteness and Inefficiency, Pradeep Dubey, pp. 363-376

Hamiltonian Dynamics in Economics

organized by David Cass and Karl Shell
Vol. 12, No. 1, February 1976

• Introduction to Hamiltonian Dynamics in Economics, David Cass and Karl Shell, pp. 1-10
• On Optimal Steady States of n-Sector Growth Models when utility is Discounted, Jose´ A. Scheinkman, pp. 11-30
• The Structure and Stability of Competitive Dynamical Systems, David Cass and Karl Shell, pp. 31-70
• Saddle Points of Hamiltonian Systems in Convex Lagrange Problems Having a Nonzero Discount Rate, R. Tyrrell Rockafellar, pp. 71-113
• Existence of Solutions to Hamiltonian Dynamical Systems of Optimal Growth, Robert E. Gaines, pp. 114-130
• A Characterization of the Normalized Restricted Profit Function, Lawrence J. Lau, pp 131-163
• Global Asymptotic Stability of Optimal Control Systems with Applications to the Theory of Economic Growth, William A. Brock and Jose´A. Scheinkman, pp. 164-190
• A Growth Property in Concave-Convex Hamiltonian Systems, R. Tyrrell Rockafellar, pp. 191-196